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Impoverishing “the greatest law
school in the world”: The Financial
Collapse of Harvard Law
School, 1895–1909
Bruce A. Kimball
Among the recent financial problems of Harvard University, those of its law
school are particularly onerous, because the recession of 2008–09 caught the
school in the middle of a large building project, forcing it to continue to spend
heavily while the value and income of its endowment declined dramatically.1
This present difficulty makes an examination of the impoverishment of Harvard
Law School (HLS) that occurred a century ago particularly intriguing. The
financial collapse during the administration of Dean James Barr Ames (1846–
1910) has been overlooked by scholars,2 but had a profound impact on the
school by depriving it of resources needed for continued development and
undermining its position at the time as “the greatest law school in the world.”3
While struggling to recover from the financial disaster over the next four
decades, HLS lost what had appeared in 1900 to be an unassailable position
of leadership and fell back into the pack of other leading law schools at major
universities. This result demonstrates the prescience of the statement made in
1906 by Harvard University President Charles W. Eliot: “In the competition
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between American universities, and between American and foreign universities,
those universities will inevitably win which have the largest amounts of free
money,” that is, unrestricted cash funds.4 HLS essentially squandered its “free
money” during the administration of Dean Ames from 1895 to 1909, leaving it
destitute and unable to recover for a number of complicated reasons until the
1960s.
This outcome entailed several profound ironies. HLS impoverished itself
by violating the path-breaking financial policies of President Eliot (1834–1926)
who, during his administration from 1869 to 1909, laid the foundation for the
university’s subsequent financial preeminence. Why did “the most successful
of the university’s professional schools,” in Eliot’s words,5 ignore his own farsighted financial policies that brought prosperity to those other schools, and
why did Eliot permit, even encourage, the law school to do so? Secondly,
Eliot, Ames, and the HLS faculty and alumni continued to think of HLS as
the most successful professional school at Harvard or “in our country or in
the world,”6 even though the finances of HLS had deteriorated below those
of other Harvard professional schools by the time Ames and Eliot stepped
down in 1909. Finally, and most remarkably, HLS failed in its efforts to recover
financially precisely because it was widely viewed at Harvard as enormously
successful and prosperous, and the school found it difficult to convince
everyone—including itself—that it needed help.
I.
By the end of the 19 century, HLS had achieved unquestioned preeminence
among law schools in the United States. The school attained this leading
position, on the one hand, because, during his administration from 1870 to
1895, HLS Dean Christopher C. Langdell (1826–1906) established the model of
academic meritocracy that would proliferate throughout legal and professional
education over the next century.7 That model incorporated the admissions
requirement of a bachelor’s degree or its equivalent, the sequenced curriculum
and its extension to three years, the inductive pedagogy of teaching from cases,
the hurdle of written examinations for continuation and graduation, the written
examination posing hypothetical problems, the program of study leading to
academic honor, the independent career track for faculty, the transformation
of the library from a textbook dispensary to a resource for scholarship, and
the national alumni association actively supporting the school. On the other
th
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hand, Langdell instituted a new successful financial strategy for professional
education, maintaining that a professional school devoted to academic merit
would prosper because higher standards would produce better graduates who
would be more marketable, making the school more attractive to prospective
students.
As a result, HLS maintained the highest academic standards for admission
and graduation of any law school in the country, while at the same time
increasing the enrollment and geographic range of its students beyond that
of any counterpart. “The school, I am glad to say, grows year by year more
national. This year 740 graduates come to us from more than 100 colleges….
Some 70 men, formerly students of this school, are now teaching law in other
schools,” observed Ames in 1904.8 In the following year, the percentages of
college graduates among students at leading university law schools were as
follows: Harvard, 99 percent; Columbia, 82 percent; Chicago, 60 percent; Yale,
35 percent; Pennsylvania, 35 percent; Northwestern, 31 percent; Michigan, 13
percent; Cornell, 10 percent; and Illinois 7 percent.9 In 1909, HLS was “larger
than at any previous time in its history,”10 and “reached its highest point in
numbers and influence.”11 Furthermore, this expansion “both in the number
of students and in the development of its library and material resources…
was attained in spite of the requirement of a college degree as a condition
for admission to regular standing, and in spite of other stringent regulations
designed to maintain a high standing.”12 In fact, the increase in enrollment and
in academic standards were not in tension but mutually reinforcing, because
“the cause of the remarkable development of the school since 1870–71” lay in
“the spreading confidence in our standards and methods as illustrated by our
graduates.”13 Consequently, “the school is now larger than at any previous
time in its history, in spite, or in consequence, of the raising of its standards,”
observed President A. Lawrence Lowell, soon after succeeding Eliot in 1909.14
Testimony to the school’s preeminence was abundant. In 1898, the famous
Oxford legal scholar Albert V. Dicey asserted, “Harvard is quite ahead of
the universities of the U.S.…and the law school is their greatest triumph,”
8.

James B. Ames, Address, in Harvard Law School Association, Report of the Eighteenth
Annual Meeting, 70–71 (Harvard Law School Association 1904). See Charles W. Eliot,
Annual Report 1904–05, 39 (Harvard Univ. 1906).

9.

Eliot, supra note 8, at 39.

10.

A. Lawrence Lowell, Annual Report of the President 1909–10, 16 (Harvard Univ. 1911).

11.

Samuel Williston, Annual Report of the Dean of the Law School 1908–09, 164 (Harvard
Univ. 1910).

12.

Ezra R. Thayer, Annual Report of the Dean of the Law School 1909–10, 136 (Harvard Univ.
1911).

13.

Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report 1902–03, 20–21 (Harvard Univ. 1904). Eliot misquotes
James B. Ames, Annual Report of the Dean of the Law School 1902–03, 168.

14.

Lowell, supra note 10, at 16.
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and recommended importing the HLS system into England.15 The 1903
report of the Harvard Overseers Visiting Committee assigned to assess the
law school, observed, “It is almost needless for the Committee to say that the
legal education given at the Harvard Law School is the best ever given either
in England or America…and the school, as a whole, is today the model for
law schools throughout the country.”16 In 1904, non-alumnus and future U.S.
President and Supreme Court Chief Justice William H. Taft called HLS “the
greatest law school in the world,”17 confirming the view of President Eliot, who
was not given to extravagant praise: “If there be a more successful school in
our country or in the world for any profession, I can only say that I do not
know where it is. The school seems to have reached the climax of success in
professional education.”18
Commensurate with the rise of its prestige, influence, and enrollment, HLS
became wealthy. Initially, the great majority of students, alumni, and local
lawyers opposed Langdell’s introduction of the academic meritocratic model,
and the enrollment at HLS dropped precipitously at several points during the
1870s, causing revenue to fall dramatically due to the school’s heavy reliance
on tuition.19 But in the early 1880s, the school received three significant gifts
for a new building, an endowed professorship, and a fund to purchase books,
and in the mid-1880s enrollment began to climb rapidly and continued to grow
through the last ten years of Ames’s deanship.20 From 132 students in 1870–71,
the enrollment surpassed 400 for the first time in 1892–93, then 500 in 1897–98,
600 in 1899–1900, 700 in 1903–04, and 800 in 1911–12.21 Already in 1887, Eliot
announced publicly, “the law school is now in a position of great strength.”22
Ten years later, trying to recruit a new faculty member, he observed, “The
15.

A. V. Dicey to Elinor M. Dicey (13–14 Nov. 1898), quoted in Memorials of Albert Venn Dicey,
164 (Robert S. Rait ed., MacMillan 1925).

16.

Overseers Standing Committee to Visit the Law School, Report (Apr. 8, 1903), Reports
of the Visiting Committees of the University Overseers, 1890–1970, (on file with Harvard
University Archives), v. 1b, 720–21.

17.

Taft, supra note 3, at 15.

18.

Eliot, supra note 5, at 68.

19.

See Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report 1880–81, 26–27 (Harvard Univ. 1882); Charles W. Eliot,
Annual Report 1883–84, 34 (Harvard Univ. 1885); The Centennial History of the Harvard
Law School, 1817–1917 39 (Harvard Law School Ass’n 1918); Letter from Charles W. Eliot to
William C. Lane (Oct. 2, 1922) (Charles W. Eliot Papers, Harvard Univ. Archives, box 68,
f. 1874 A-G). Citations to Eliot’s papers in the Harvard Univ. Archives follow the pre-2006
citation system.

20.

Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report 1881–82, 26–27, 30 (Harvard Univ. 1883); Charles W. Eliot,
Annual Report 1884–85, 54 (Harvard Univ. 1886); Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report 1889–90,
24 (Harvard Univ. 1891); Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report 1896–97, 25 (Harvard Univ. 1898).

21.
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Report 1910–11, 131 (Harvard Univ. 1912).

22.
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pecuniary condition of the law school is distinctly prosperous. It has had a
large surplus for several years past.”23 Indeed, beginning in 1886–87 the annual
surplus began to grow ever larger:
		
Year

Annual Surplus
of HLS (dollars)24

1886-87

2,850

1887-88

8,291

1888-89

6,525

1889-90

12,193

1890-91

11,635

1891-92

18,314

1892-93

16,355

1893-94

13,666

1894-95

27,046

1895-96

24,089

1896-97

10,615

1897-98

33,107

1898-99

27,547

1899-00

32,963

1900-01

33,529

1901-02

42,346

1902-03

33,550

1903-04

48,761

1904-05

44,119

1905-06

49,448

As a result, HLS accumulated an enormous cash reserve. It is difficult to
calculate the exact total at any given time because certain gifts and other funds
for current use were received, carried, and then expended at various points.
Nevertheless, the overall trajectory was a rapid ascent “owing chiefly to more
tuition fees,”25 as enrollment grew. In 1895, Eliot put the surplus at $112,004 and

23.

Charles W. Eliot to Blewett Lee (Mar. 13, 1897), Charles W. Eliot Papers, (Harvard Univ.
Archives, box 91, letterbook, 1889–98, leaves 167a–168).

24.

Winthrop H. Wade, Twenty Years of the Harvard Law School Association, 8 (Harvard
Graduates’ Magazine 1907). Dollar amounts are from the year listed.

25.

Annual Report of the Treasurer of Harvard University 1889–90, 5 (Harvard Univ. 1891).
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two years later at $133,000.26 At the high point in about 1906, the unrestricted
cash reserves of the school approximated $498,000. This huge cache of “free
money” was five times the annual budget of the school and exceeded the sum
of all its endowed funds, totaling about $394,624.27 By comparison, Columbia
University Law School, generally recognized as “the nation’s second best” law
school at the time,28 lacked any significant cash reserves and was seeking gifts
for a new building.29 At Yale, the law school became solvent in the 1890s and
began to accrue endowment and to construct a new building, but it lacked the
enrollment and tuition base of either Harvard or Columbia, as well as deeppocketed alumni in the financial centers of New York or Boston.30 Nor was the
University of Chicago Law School yet a competitor, given that between 1902
and 1904 it borrowed HLS Professor Joseph H. Beale to serve as founding
dean and establish the HLS model there.31 At the beginning of the 20th
century, therefore, the preeminence of HLS in academic standards, wealth,
and prestige seemed insurmountable.
II.
With success came problems. Austin Hall, the new building completed in
1883, had been expected to house the school for fifty years, but was already
outgrown by 1891.32 Space was so constricted by September 1895 that the 1Ls
had to line up several hours early to secure a classroom seat, and an embarrassed
President Eliot appointed a committee “with full power to determine the
mode of assigning seats to first-year students, it being understood that the
formation of a line of students several hours before the assignment of seats
should not be repeated.”33 By 1897, when the entering class numbered 209,
26.

Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report 1894–95, 27 (Harvard Univ. 1896); Eliot to Lee, supra note
23.

27.

As of July 31, 1906, HLS had cash reserves of $347,742, a discretionary cash account
designated for the use of the library of $100,000, and a cash surplus for the 1905–06 academic
year of about $50,000, exclusive of gifts toward endowment of $116,250. Annual Report of
the Treasurer 1905–06, 67, 102–103 (Harvard Univ. 1907).

28.

Robert A. McCaughey. Stand, Columbia: A History of Columbia University in the City of
New York, 1754–2004, 231 (Columbia Univ. Press 2003).

29.

Julius Goebel, Jr., A History of the Law School of Columbia University, 186 (Columbia
Univ. Press 1955).

30.

Frederick C. Hicks, History of the Yale Law School to 1915, 210–15 (Yale Univ. Press 1935);
Brooks M. Kelley, Yale: A History, 276–77, 340–41 (Yale Univ. Press 1974); John H. Langbein,
Law School in a University: Yale’s Distinctive Path in the Later Nineteenth Century, in
History of Yale Law School, 60–61 (Anthony T. Kronman ed., Yale Univ. Press 2004).

31.

Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report 1901–02, 44 (Harvard Univ. 1903); Letter from Joseph H.
Beale to Charles W. Eliot (Oct. 27, 1903) Charles W. Eliot Papers, (Harvard Univ. Archives,
box 274–275).

32.

Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report 1890–91, 19 (Harvard Univ. 1892). C. C. Langdell, Annual
Report of the Dean of the Law School 1890–91, 114 (Harvard Univ. 1892).

33.

HLS Faculty, Minutes of Meetings, Harvard Law School Library Special Collections, 30
Sep. 1896.
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it became evident to the president, the dean, and the Overseers Visiting
Committee that “two costly improvements will need soon to be made for the
law school. Its building will have to be enlarged, and the class of the first year
will have to be divided into two sections.”34 Even though the faculty tightened
standards for admission and continuation,35 enrollment continued to grow,
and the president wrote in 1900, “An immediate enlargement of the building
is imperatively demanded.”36
By 1904, Dean Ames maintained that the overcrowding was threatening the
students’ work at HLS, because, apart from
the inadequacy of [library] stack, the lecture rooms, and professors’ rooms,
and of the administration and cataloguing accommodations…the insufficient
accommodations of the reading room are a serious menace to the effectiveness
of the school. When the students numbered 400 or less, a large majority of
them did the greater part of their work in Austin Hall. They were always sure
of finding a seat at a table…. Being within easy reach of all the books, they
formed the habit of consulting freely the authorities, and gained a familiarity
with the reports and treatises…. Today the students, as a rule, do the greater
part of their work in their own rooms. Many would prefer to work in Austin
Hall, but the small seating accommodation makes it impossible to count
upon obtaining a place at a table, and many students abandon the attempt
to get one…a return to the former practice of making the reading room the
chief place of work of the students is imperatively demanded, if the school is
to maintain its high standard.37

In the meantime, planning for additional space had begun, but foundered
on disagreements and delays. In winter and spring of 1898 the HLS faculty
developed a plan for enlarging Austin Hall, and asked the Harvard Corporation
to authorize the project. In fall 1899, the faculty again requested authorization,
but the corporation balked, preferring a new building to an addition and citing
the rising construction costs. In January 1901, a new faculty committee debated
whether to enlarge Austin Hall or erect a new building and began consulting
with architects.38 Eliot’s leave of absence during winter delayed progress until
June, when he and the corporation endorsed architectural plans for a new
building. During the last half of 1901, the faculty persuaded the corporation to

34.

Eliot, Annual Report 1896–97, supra note 20, at 25. See James B. Ames, Annual Report 1896–
97, 162–63 (Harvard Univ. 1898); James B. Ames, Annual Report 1897–98, 162 (Harvard
Univ. 1899); Overseers Standing Committee to Visit the Law School, Report (Apr. 13,
1898), Reports of the Visiting Committees of the University Overseers, 1890–1970, Harvard
University Archives, v. 1a, 527–28.

35.

HLS Faculty, supra note 33, at Oct. 8, 1897; Nov. 17, 1897; Nov. 12, 1900.

36.

Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report 1899–1900, 17–18 (Harvard Univ. 1901).

37.

James B. Ames, Annual Report 1903–04, 181 (Harvard Univ. 1905).

38.

HLS Faculty, supra note 33, at Feb. 24, 1898; Mar. 17, 1898; Nov. 6 & 13, 1899; Jan. 28, 1901.
See also Feb. 1 & 18, 1901.
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enlarge Austin Hall instead, and during 1902 plans were drawn and contracts
tendered, but construction was postponed again due to the high cost.39
Meanwhile, enrollment had stabilized so the faculty and the corporation
decided in 1903 to shelve the project, over the protest of the Overseers Visiting
Committee. Then a large increase in the entering class in fall 1903 prompted the
faculty to urge that construction begin in the spring.40 During 1904, however,
the corporation dug in its heels and refused to approve the addition to Austin
Hall, thinking it insufficient; and in December, the faculty capitulated and
agreed to an entirely new building.41 When plans were completed in June
1905, the faculty asked the corporation to authorize the project immediately so
the building “can be ready for use by the opening of the fall term of 1906,”42
lest “a whole year will be lost.”43 But the corporation waited until fall 1905 to
solicit bids and construction finally began in spring 1906.44 The structure was
to be named in honor of Langdell, the only living professor to have a building
named after him at Harvard.45
The decade of delays and consultations were frustrating to all concerned,46
including, perhaps, Langdell, who died in July 1906 before Langdell Hall was
opened. Yet, Eliot believed that the process had improved the final plan,47
although many felt that the appearance of Langdell Hall did not harmonize
with its surroundings.48 The aesthetic issue was significant because the edifice
39.

Letter from Charles W. Eliot to James B. Ames (Jun. 10, 1901) (Charles W. Eliot Papers,
Harvard Univ. Archives, box 92, letterbook, 113); HLS Faculty, supra note 33, at Jun. 22, 1901;
Eliot, supra note 32, at 43–44.

40.

Eliot, supra note 13, at 20; HLS Faculty, supra note 33, at Dec. 24, 1903; Report, Overseers
Standing Committee, supra note 16, at 719–20.

41.

Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report 1903–04, 25 (Harvard Univ. 1905); HLS Faculty, supra note
33, at Dec. 12, 1904. But see HLS Faculty, supra note 33, at Jan. 16, 1905.

42.

Letter from Francis C. Lowell and Thomas N. Perkins, Committee of the Corporation
on the Law School Building, Report to the Corporation (Jun. 22, 1905), Charles W. Eliot
Papers (Harvard Univ. Archives, box 276–277). See Eliot, supra note 8, at 58.

43.

Letter from Francis C. Lowell to Charles F. Adams (Jun. 22, 1905), Charles W. Eliot Papers
(Harvard Univ. Archives, box 276–277).

44.

Eliot, supra note 8, at 39. See HLS Faculty, supra note 33, at Oct. 3, 1905.

45.

Overseers Standing Committee, supra note 34, at 527–28; Eugene Wambaugh, Langdell Hall
and the Earlier Buildings of the Harvard Law School, in 20 The Green Bag, 302 (1908).

46.

Overseers Standing Committee to Visit the Law School, Report (Feb. 28, 1906), Reports
of the Visiting Committees of the University Overseers, 1890–1970, Harvard University
Archives, v. 1b, 883.

47.

Eliot, supra note 8, at 39.

48.

Albert F. Veenfliet, Letters to his Family and Harvard Memorabilia,1902–09, Oct. 1, 1906
(on file with the Harvard Law School Library Special Collections); Austin W. Scott, Letters
from a Law Student to his Family, 1906–1908, Oct. 4, 1906 (Harvard Law School 1974);
James B. Ames, Annual Report 1906–07, 153 (Harvard Univ. 1908); Eliot, supra note 4, at
26–27.
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was massive. Due to financial constraints, only three-fifths of Langdell Hall
was erected at this time, yet even that fraction was twice as large as Austin
Hall; and when completed, Langdell Hall was expected to “remain for many
years one of the largest buildings in Cambridge.”49 Construction went on
throughout the year 1906–07, and by the time the building was opened in
October 1907,50 everyone had apparently tired of the project. Prompted as
much by custom as enthusiasm, plans were made for a dedication ceremony,
and Eliot invited A. V. Dicey to come from Oxford and give the dedication
address. But when he declined, the initiative lost steam, and since there was
no donor to honor, the event was cancelled. When the remaining two-fifths
of the building was completed in 1929, a dedication was held, at which point
Langdell scarcely received any mention.51
A significant reason for the ambivalence and 10-year delay in planning and
building Langdell Hall was that the entire cost, amounting to about $400,000,
was paid out of the unrestricted cash reserves of the school.52 Already in his
annual report for 1896–97 President Eliot wrote that “fortunately the [tuition]
earnings of the school are large enough” to cover the expense of a new
building, and he repeated the point in 1900.53 In his 1898–99 report, Dean
Ames stated without qualification, “The expense of the new building will be
met wholly from the surplus earnings of the school.”54 Given this approach,
there was no reason to rush the expenditure, and Eliot even noted that the
delay in 1902 meant, “the annual surpluses of the school can be accumulated
to cover the extra cost of the new building.”55 Conversely, the Overseers
49.

Wambaugh, supra note 45, at 305. See Eliot, supra note 4, at 26–27.

50.

Eliot, supra note 4, at 26–27; Veenfliet, supra note 48, at Oct. 1, 1906; Ames, Annual Report,
1906–07, supra note 48, at 153; Scott, supra note 48, at Oct. 4, 1906, Oct. 16, 1907, Jan. 8 1908;
Wambaugh, supra note 45, at 302.

51.

HLS Faculty, supra note 33, at Feb. 21, 1907, Mar. 21, 1907, May 20 & 28, 1907, Jun. 22, 1907;
Letter from Charles W. Eliot to Albert V. Dicey (May 28, 1907), Charles W. Eliot Papers,
(Harvard Univ. Archives, box 96, letterbook, 84); [Sarah R. Ames], Memoir of James Barr
Ames, in James Barr Ames, Lectures on Legal History and Miscellaneous Legal Essays
(Harvard Univ. Press 1913); F. A. D. Atwood, Old Folks’ Day, New Boston, N.H., Jun. 13,
1907, Thirteenth Reunion, 6n (John B. Clarke 1908).

52.

The building itself cost about 365,000 dollars, and furnishings apparently ran another 35,000
dollars. Annual Report of the Treasurer 1905–06, 10 (Harvard Univ. 1907); Annual Report of
the Treasurer 1907–08, 14 (Harvard Univ. 1909); Annual Report of the Treasurer 1908–09, 12
(Harvard Univ. 1910); Wambaugh, supra note 45, at 303-4; Francis Rawle, A Hundred Years
of the Harvard Law School, 1817-1917, Harvard Graduates’ Magazine 26, Dec. 1817 at 186;
Lowell to Adams, supra note 43.

53.

Eliot, Annual Report 1896–97, supra note 20, at 25. See Eliot, supra note 36, at 17–18.

54.

James B. Ames, Annual Report 1898–99, 174 (Harvard Univ. 1900).

55.

Eliot, supra note 31, at 44.
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Visiting Committee argued that, since the money was in hand, construction
could begin as soon as possible.56 In any case, the financing arrangement was
widely known and publicized at the time.57
The depletion of its “free money” had significant consequences for HLS.
First, it eliminated the reserves that could carry the school through difficult
times without drastic cuts. For example, the Panic of 1907 caused other schools
at Harvard to feel pinched.58 In addition, the loss of reserves made any decline
in enrollment and tuition an immediate threat. Although the total enrollment
of HLS was still strong and growing in 1904–05, the graduates of Harvard and
other colleges had begun to exhibit a worrisome shift away from enrolling in
law school toward entering business.59 In the late 1910s the threat was realized
when World War I brought a precipitous drop in enrollment.60 Moreover,
depleting the cash reserve entailed the loss of annual income from the interest
on that fund. In 1914, Ames’s successor as dean, Ezra R. Thayer, lamented the
loss of $15,000 in annual income that previously had come from investing the
cash spent on Langdell Hall.61
Finally, the maintenance cost on the new building increased annual
expenses significantly. Annual “general expenses” at HLS more than doubled
from $11,752 before Langdell Hall came on line to $25,633 afterward.62
Concurrently, the university introduced a new policy of distributing overhead
charges to the units,63 and HLS showed a new “University charge” in 1907–08
of $7,165, which grew to $9,148 in 1908–09. These new factors reduced the
annual surplus of the school from $41,351 in 1905–06 to $11,452 in 1908–09, and
then produced a deficit of $16,262 in 1911–12, which continued thereafter. In
56.

Overseers Standing Committee, supra note 16, at 719–20.

57.

Wade, supra note 24, at 8; Transcript, Austin W. Scott, Harvard Law School as it used to be
(Nov. 15, 1964) (Harvard Law School Library Special Collections); Rawle, supra note 52, at
186: Wambaugh, supra note 45, at 303–4.

58.

Wallace B. Donham, The Graduate School of Business Administration, 1908–1929, in The
Development of Harvard University since the Inauguration of President Eliot 1869–1929,
534 (Samuel E. Morison ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1930).

59.

Eliot, supra note 4, at 26–27. A. L. Lowell, Annual Report 1911–12, 17–18 (Harvard Univ.
1913); Bailey B. Burritt, Professional Distribution of College and University Graduates, 78
(U.S. Office of Education 1912); McGruder E. Sadler, A Comparative Personnel Study of
Ministerial, Medical, and Law Students 1–51 (1929) (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale Univ.).

60.

Rawle, supra note 52, at 186.

61.

Letter from Ezra R. Thayer to Mark A. D. Howe (Mar. 28, 1914) (on file with Harvard
Law School, Dean’s Office Records, Harvard University Archives, box 1: Dean Thayer
Correspondence Subject Files, f. University Relations 1). See The Centennial History, supra
note 19, at 57, 107, 114–15, 119.

62.

Annual Report of the Treasurer 1905–06, 10 (Harvard Univ. 1907); Annual Report of the
Treasurer 1908–09, 12 (Harvard Univ. 1910).

63.

Eliot, supra note 31, at 11–14; Eliot, supra note 8, at 58–9.
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Ames’s final year as dean—1908–09—the cash reserves of HLS had fallen from
an amount equaling five times the annual budget to one quarter of the annual
budget, or $31,660.64
Given the clear prospect of this financial collapse as the plans to build
and finance Langdell Hall unfolded between 1897 and 1907, it is ironic that
Harvard officials continued to celebrate the prosperity of HLS. In 1904, Eliot
testified, “the law school is the most successful of the university’s professional
[s]chools…in the relation of its receipts to its actual disbursements and its
desirable expenditures.”65 In view of this “great prosperity,” the salaries of HLS
professors were raised in 1904, and the president affirmed, “The pecuniary
prosperity of the school, quite in contrast with the condition of the other
departments of the university, made this action possible and just.”66 As late as
1907, a history of the HLS alumni association commended the “extraordinary
growth” of the school in various measures, including the surplus.67 Published
in 1908, the standard scholarly history of HLS applauded “the great series
of benefactions which have since provided so ample an endowment for the
institution.”68 Even after retiring in 1909 and observing the deficits of the
school, Eliot continued to maintain, “The law school is the most successful
department of the entire university.”69
So loud and incessant was the drumbeat about the school’s prosperity
that prominent administrators and alumni of the university continued to
affirm it well into the next decade. When Harvard University conducted
its first modern fundraising campaign, between 1916 and 1920, the assistant
comptroller informed the leaders of the campaign: “The law school which, I
understand, is going to raise some money, is easily the wealthiest department
of the university.”70 The campaign chairman, who worked with fellow alumnus
James Pierpont Morgan in New York, replied, “I agree with you that the
law school, so far as I can see, doesn’t seem to need money nearly as much

64.
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as the rest of the university.”71 As a result, the university campaign did not
incorporate into its list of “urgent needs” the HLS effort to raise endowment
funds in honor of its centennial in 1917.72
III.
Ezra R. Thayer, who became HLS dean in 1910, was apparently the first
to comprehend and analyze the financial decline of HLS. Coming to the
deanship from a law firm outside of HLS, he arrived unaware of the problem
but in his second year analyzed expenses, revenue, enrollment, and tuition in
prior decades and foresaw not only the coming deficits but also the structural
problem in HLS finances.73 Furthermore, he realized “that the mistake about
our wealth is widespread and I think this is an unhealthy situation.”74
Thayer then looked for ways to publicize the “poverty” of HLS to the
Harvard community, a radical departure from the message of the prior fifteen
years. His annual report of 1912–13 began “bringing to the public attention some
facts about our financial condition,” although “I have had some doubt about
the right way of publishing them because one feels some embarrassment about
a public wail concerning the poverty of his institution.”75 He next proposed
to the editor of the Harvard Alumni Bulletin that that periodical “might be a
good way of bringing to the public attention some facts about our financial
condition …. The idea that the law school needs money will no doubt surprise
most people. The general impression is that the school is rolling in wealth.
This is not surprising considering the record of the school…But the conditions
which made such things possible…are now altogether changed as can easily
be shown; and…the impression that we are so rich is not a healthy one.”76 The
Bulletin printed Thayer’s comments, extracted from his annual report, while
observing, “the fact that there can be any need for money [in the law school]…
will be noted with some surprise.”77
71.
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In 1915, Thayer committed suicide, setting back the effort to repair the
finances of HLS. No dean before or after so frankly confronted the problems
of the school’s tuition-dependent model and the imprudence of spending
the HLS surplus while incurring new expenses.78 Thayer’s insights informed
the HLS fundraising appeals in 1916 and 1917, even though most university
administrators and HLS alumni remained uncomprehending due to the annual
surpluses achieved by the school in the past. In fact, these HLS appeals even
made explicit comparisons to show that the school’s student/faculty ratio and
endowment/student ratio were much worse than at other Harvard schools.79
Celebrations had become confessions. But HLS attracted little sympathy, and
its centennial campaign raised barely a quarter of the goal of $1.1 million.80
Yet, greater than either the irony that HLS collapsed financially while
Eliot, Ames, and the faculty and alumni continued to think of it as Harvard’s
most successful professional school, or the irony that HLS failed to recover
financially during the 1910s because it was widely viewed as prosperous,
was the irony that HLS impoverished itself by violating the fundamental
financial policies of President Eliot. It was Eliot who laid the foundation
for Harvard’s subsequent financial preeminence by positing and instituting
several path-breaking policies during his administration from 1869 to 1909.
Eliot embedded these policies in his thiry-nine annual reports, which he wrote
with the intention to explain not only the affairs of Harvard University, but
also the best way to run a university.81
One of his cardinal policies was that universities ought “to spend every year
all their income”82 and never carry over a surplus from a given year. In fact,
Eliot maintained, “it is not possible to avoid occasional deficits,” because “to
avoid deficits invariably would mean to aim deliberately at an annual surplus,
and to keep sufficient reserves to guarantee that annual surplus. This cautious
policy, which is appropriate to an industrial or commercial establishment, the
78.
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president and Fellows [of the Corporation] think not to be the best in an
educational and charitable institution.”83 The supposed profligacy of Eliot’s
policy of deficit spending has been criticized in at least one prominent analysis
without appreciating that Eliot’s purpose was to justify the institution’s need
for gifts.84 As he wrote to the president of Johns Hopkins University in 1887,
“So long as the community sees that the trustees [of Johns Hopkins] can and
do build out of income…new endowments will be somewhat improbable…. Is
it not time to mortgage—so to speak—your whole income, as we do at Harvard?
A man who can build a good home without touching his principal is sure to
be counted rich.”85
Another of Eliot’s fundamental policies was to avoid dependence on
tuition and instead to build a large endowment of invested funds, preferably
unrestricted. “The law of supply and demand…never has worked well in the
province of high education,” asserted Eliot in his inaugural address of 1869.86
He related this policy particularly to the faculty of arts and sciences, but it was
no less true that “a professional school of high grade ought not to depend on
tuition fees…. In law schools, as in other educational institutions, it is only
the elementary instruction, given year after year to large classes, which can be
self-supporting.”87
Recognizing that donors rarely give unrestricted endowment funds, leaving
full discretion to university authorities to spend the income, Eliot repeatedly
announced a third guideline: “There is no more desirable gift to a university
than a fund to endow a professorship.”88 The reason that “of all university
endowments the most fundamental and permanently valuable are endowed
professorships”89 is that such a gift “sets free resources now used to meet those
charges” for salary.90 In a sense, endowment for a professorship is fungible,
since salaries have to be paid one way or another. Hence, “whoever endows
one of the…professorships which have no endowment” and “whoever gives an
unrestricted fund contributes by its full amount to the same end.”91
Another cardinal financial policy was not to fund the construction of
buildings out of university resources because, on the one hand, “experience
83.
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84.

Seymour E. Harris, Economics of Harvard (McGraw-Hill 1970) (repeatedly criticizes Eliot
on this point).

85.

Letter from Charles W. Eliot to Daniel C. Gilman (Oct. 29, 1887) (Daniel Coit Gilman
Papers, Johns Hopkins Univ. Library Special Collections, Ms. 1).

86.

Charles W. Eliot, Inaugural Address, reprinted in A Turning Point in Higher Education, 20
(Harvard Univ. Press 1969).

87.

Eliot, supra note 22, at 13.

88.

Eliot, Annual Report 1906–07, 38.

89.

Eliot, supra note 31, at 61.

90.

Eliot, Annual Report 1883–84, supra note 19, at 44.

91.

Id.

20

Journal of Legal Education

has shown that new buildings will be provided by gift nearly as fast as they
are needed.”92 On the other hand, experience also showed that “as fast as new
resources are placed in their hands…the Corporation incur new permanent
charges.” Gifts, in fact, are expensive and buildings more so, because
“enlargements, improvements, and repairs fall upon the Corporation.”93
Mindful of this problem of paying for the maintenance of buildings received
as gifts, Eliot announced a new policy in 1903 that Harvard would not accept
any gift for a building without an accompanying endowment to pay for its
maintenance.94
Those five policies culminated in a sixth: Harvard always needed more
gifts. Eliot’s consistent approach was to identify more needs and point to the
limitations of resources. When acknowledging that “the total endowment of
the university continues to increase,” Eliot unfailingly observed, “nevertheless,
many urgent needs weigh upon the minds of the faculties and the governing
boards.”95 Even while gratefully recognizing enormous gifts, the president was
utterly shameless in asking for more in the next breath: “It may seem strange
to urge the need of further endowments immediately after the receipt of the
large…Endowment Fund; but the fact is that…the income of that fund is not
applicable to charges already incurred, or to any expansions of the work of the
College.”96
Given his insistence on applying these six policies to all other sectors of
Harvard, it is ironic not only that HLS—the most successful professional school—
violated them, but did so with Eliot’s concurrence and even encouragement.
As noted above, HLS began accumulating an annual surplus in 1887, and Eliot
and others publicized it and crowed about the school’s “prosperity.” No other
unit of Harvard received this treatment in the 2,700 pages of Eliot’s annual
reports. Before HLS began accumulating its large surplus, the president urged
the school to escape dependence on tuition and seek gifts for endowment, as
prescribed by his general policies. Shortly after Dean Langdell arrived in 1870,
Eliot emphasized that “the law school is very inadequately endowed, and is
therefore somewhat dependent…upon the number of its students. It is this
deplorable dependence which debases so many of the professional schools
of this country.”97 In 1878 Langdell concurred, and in 1880 Eliot repeated,
“the endowment of the law school is deplorably small.”98 In the mid-1880s
92.
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the president stated, typically, “it is to be hoped, that the legal profession
and the community are beginning to perceive the importance of endowing
professional as well as college education.”99
However, after the three gifts of Austin Hall, the professorship, and the
book fund arrived in the early 1880s and the annual surpluses began to appear
in the late 1880s, Eliot ceased lamenting the law school’s tuition dependence
and small endowment though he continued doing so for every other unit at
Harvard. For HLS, he began to observe instead that the “surpluses…will be
available for use in any period of temporary depression.”100 Regarding another
Harvard department, Eliot stated in 1906 his customary injunction that “it is
very desirable to diminish the dependence…on the receipts from students.”
But, a few pages later, he observed that “the extraordinary prosperity of the
law school continued during the year 1904–05, the number of students being
larger than ever.”101 HLS was apparently exempt from Eliot’s policies and
could depend on tuition.
The dean, the faculty, and the Overseers Visiting Committee of HLS did
not agree. In a major address at the American Bar Association in 1895, HLS
Professor James B. Thayer maintained, “Our law schools must be endowed as
our colleges are endowed. If they are not, then the managers must needs consult
[sic] the market, and…bid for numbers of students instead of excellence of
work.”102 In the late 1890s, as HLS became overcrowded, Dean Ames and
the Overseers Visiting Committee expressed “regret that a large portion of
the surplus earnings of the school should be used for no better purpose than
an extensive enlargement of the building.”103 Instead, they requested in 1898
that the surplus be moved into an endowment for a professorship honoring
Langdell, partly to preserve the money and also because “the appearance in
the Treasurer’s Report of a surplus fund…would be a serious obstacle to…
raising the money for the addition to Austin Hall by contributions from the
alumni of the school.”104 Although this request was entirely consistent with the
view that Eliot had pressed on the president of Johns Hopkins University and
everyone else over the previous three decades, he and the corporation balked,
saying that “it would be more complimentary to Langdell if the alumni of
the law school should contribute…a Langdell professorship rather than a
means of extending Austin Hall.” More generally, they opposed “reducing the
99.
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surplus of the law school by making a specific appropriation of a large part
of it” because “the entire fund is now disposable, principal and interest.”105
This response seemed to directly contradict Eliot’s emphatic policies about
avoiding a surplus, increasing endowment, endowing professorships, and
financing buildings.
In March 1898, Ames and faculty countered by asking that $100,000 of
the surplus be transferred into a professorship or an endowment for the
library,106 and a month later the Overseers Visiting Committee asserted that
“the endowment of the law school is very moderate” and urged that “as large
a portion as possible of the existing surplus [be] devoted to the endowment of
additional professorships.”107 Nevertheless, in May 1898, the corporation voted
to move only $100,000 of the surplus into a new law School Library Fund, “the
income of which shall, until further order of the Corporation, be applied towards the
administration expenses of the law library.”108 Although this move may have
wisely recognized that donors were less inclined to support “administration”
than a building or a professorship, the designated library fund was still a cash
reserve, not a sacrosanct endowment. Furthermore, Eliot’s reports made no
announcement about needs of the school. Then, while the surplus grew by
tens of thousands of dollars each year between 1898 and 1907, the corporation
created a Langdell professorship but did not endow it, and the salary was paid
by the current revenues of the school.109 In 1903, Eliot stated even more baldly
and publicly that the annual surpluses of HLS “can be accumulated to cover
the extra cost of the new building.”110 HLS was still the only unit at Harvard
that had enough money to meet its needs by Eliot’s account, and his annual
reports did not make appeals on behalf of the school.
Meanwhile, no one associated with HLS seems to have made any effort to
raise money, as the ambivalent planning to increase the space went forward
in the early 1900s. In 1897, Dean Ames and the faculty discussed “raising the
money for the addition to Austin Hall,”111 but none of their annual reports,
meeting minutes, or extant correspondence indicate any action taken
subsequently. Nor did the alumni association help.
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Founded in 1886, the Harvard Law School Association (HLSA) was
created “to advance the cause of legal education and to promote the interests
and increase the usefulness of the Harvard Law School.”112 Over the next
two decades HLSA spent $17,375 on its own organization, publications and
meetings, while contributing $7,231 to the school for portraits, prizes, and
lectures and another $1,649 to the Harvard Law Review.113 While the crisis and
debate about the surplus and overcrowding of their alma mater unfolded
between 1897 and 1907, the alumni contentedly observed that “the life of the
association…was unmarked by any important or striking event.”114 At the same
time, HLSA was accumulating its own surplus of nearly $12,000 and, unable
to decide how to spend it, commissioned portraits of two senior faculty in
1905 and offered to equip the reading room in the extension of Austin Hall.
HLSA then canceled those gifts when the decision was made to build Langdell
Hall.115 In 1907, epitomizing the tone of self-congratulation surrounding the
school, the HLSA officers extolled their association for fulfilling its purpose,
demonstrated by “the extraordinary growth of the Harvard Law School during
the [twenty] years of the life of the law school association.”116 This correlation
demonstrated the causal role of HLSA, in their view. In 1910, as Dean Thayer
began to grapple with the financial collapse of the school, the HLSA president
“congratulate[d] the association on its continued success and prosperity” and
on its capacity “in some degree at least, to fulfill its proper function of being of
practical benefit and assistance to the law school.”117
The failure of the dean, faculty, and alumni at HLS to obtain or even seek
gifts is all the more surprising given that HLS was surrounded by this activity.
Many professors, administrators, and “friends” of other units at Harvard were
approaching donors, following up on the needs identified in Eliot’s annual
reports. In 1900, for example, the philosophy faculty drew up a detailed plan,
publicized it in Harvard publications, and successfully solicited funds for
a new building for their department, which was completed early in 1906.118
Such efforts throughout the university produced “a remarkable inflowing of
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gifts for several years past,” Eliot remarked in January 1907.119 Meanwhile, as
HLSA was congratulating itself on having provided an average of $360 a year
to its alma mater, the Harvard College 25th-year reunion class in 1904 initiated
the practice of donating $100,000 to the university at each commencement.120
Outside of Harvard, Dean Francis Wayland of Yale Law School succeeded
in raising $38,000 to complete its law building and $150,000 for endowment
by the time he retired in 1903.121 At Columbia University, $500,000 was raised
between 1905 and 1910 for a new building for its law school.122
In contrast, the dean, the faculty, and the alumni of HLS simply capitulated,
as the HLS Centennial History noted in 1918: “[A]lthough…the faculty cherished
these higher ideals…it was plain that…if the only way to get the building
was through sacrifice of the higher ideals…the pursuit of those ideals must be
left to some other institution better endowed…. So Langdell Hall was built,
and the school’s surplus spent in the undertaking.”123 Indeed, the fact that
the whole project was tailored to the surplus is shown by the construction
of only three-fifths of the building, at a cost of $400,000, the amount of the
available surplus. No effort was made to seek donations even to supplement
the school’s contribution, although Ames and the faculty “prefer to have the
whole building put up at once.”124
Within Harvard, the decline in the law school’s standing, as a result of these
financial developments, appears clearly in comparison to Harvard Medical
School (HMS), which rose from straggling behind HLS in 1895 to eclipsing it
by 1910. From the outset of his presidency, Eliot warned HMS against tuition
dependency and maintained, “no department of the university needs a large
endowment more than the medical school, or better deserves one, and there
is no department of the university in which the good to be done by a liberal
endowment would be more direct, immediate, diffusive, and lasting.”125 During
the next thirty years, he repeated this theme in lengthy paragraphs, while
calling for endowed medical professorships and gifts for medical facilities.126
By 1900 gifts had accumulated to about $1 million, and then, in response to
“the prophetic insight and the zeal of a few of the university’s teachers of
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medicine,”127 an avalanche of nearly $4 million was promised during 1900 and
1901 in order to build five major buildings, endow professorships, and support
maintenance and equipment for the buildings.128
Due to this munificence, “the medical school now has a larger endowment
than any other professional department of the university,” Eliot observed
in January 1902, “This fact is the more striking, because [thirty] years ago
it had the smallest endowment among the professional departments.”129 But
this prosperity did not deter Eliot from asking for more, in keeping with the
cardinal financial policies that he consistently applied to HMS. In January
1907 he wrote, “the [medical] buildings and the permanent funds which
accompanied them constitute the largest single addition to the resources of
the university…since it received its charter in 1650…but it is already plain
that…additional endowment will be indispensable.”130 At that point, HMS
was wealthy but had insatiable needs, while HLS was exhausting its reserves
but needed nothing. The transposition of the two schools is exemplified by
the contrast between the two-day celebration held to dedicate the five medical
buildings in September 1906,131 in contrast to the failed effort to dedicate the
three-fifths of Langdell Hall at its opening one year later. When appealing
for funds in recognition of its centennial in 1917, HLS therefore compared its
financial situation with that of the medical school, though it also had relatively
fewer resources than the divinity school, the business school, or the arts and
sciences.132
IV.
It is difficult to explain the underlying causes or the thinking of the
individuals involved in the financial collapse of HLS during the administration
of Dean Ames. One is almost tempted to suggest that Eliot was trying to
validate his policies by showing that a preeminent institution could come to
ruin by violating them. But less perverse reasons may also be posited.
During his administration from 1870 to 1895, Dean Langdell had instituted
a new financial strategy for HLS, and professional education in general, by
turning upside down the traditional thinking that low standards and low
tuition were necessary in order to attract students and secure sufficient revenue.
With Eliot’s support, Langdell argued that raising academic standards would
make the school’s degree more valuable and marketable, attracting more and
stronger students; and this new approach succeeded spectacularly, after an
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initial decline in enrollment and revenue during the late 1870s.133 That decline,
and the institution of the new model, were financed by building a surplus in
the mid-1870s and then paying out the cash reserves when the deficits occurred
in the following years.134 A few years later, that early surplus also allowed the
school to furnish Austin Hall after it was built, even though enrollment had
not fully recovered.135 Consequently, Eliot may have supported and encouraged
spending the surplus to build Langdell Hall because he believed that this
tactic simply repeated the pattern of the 1870s on a larger scale, although he
never said so. Furthermore, he may have felt that legal education would always
be highly profitable because it did not “need costly equipment, and a great
amount of instruction addressed to the individual,”136 though he recognized
that the expense of sustaining the HLS library was very high and might
become prohibitive.137
Another explanation for the financial collapse might be the self-satisfaction,
or pride, of those associated with HLS, who may have believed that the school
was simply too successful to fail. The faculty were likely surprised that “no
benefactor came forward to present the new building,” or that “the Corporation
did not think fit to provide more accommodations out of the general funds.”138
Upon assuming the deanship in 1910, Thayer did not yet understand the
financial problems, but he already sensed the atmosphere of complacent selfsatisfaction, because he warned in his first address to the alumni association:
“[W]e cannot afford, however strong may be the professional temptation, to
rejoice in past triumphs,…congratulating ourselves on what has been done
in the past. Our faces would then be turned in the wrong direction. The
Harvard Law School cannot keep its present position by resting upon its past
achievements.”139 Appropriately, Thayer was speaking at the annual dinner of
the alumni association, which gave itself far too much credit for very little
effort or contribution.
Whether due to pride or complacency, it is clear that HLS stagnated
administratively. Under Ames, the school “ran smoothly in the groove started
by Langdell. There were no marked differences of opinion.” The faculty
offered no innovations, for “there was rarely any discussion,” and the dean’s
“recommendations were habitually accepted.”140 In fact, the floor plan for the
new Langdell Hall followed closely that of Austin Hall built in 1883 under
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Langdell: Small number of large classrooms, no seminar rooms, library on
the second floor, faculty offices in the stacks. Furthermore, against Eliot’s
preference, the HLS faculty decided to persevere in Langdell’s narrow view of
law, “limiting the instruction given in that school to law determined by courts.
They therefore would not admit to the school such studies as institutional
history, government, political science, and administration national, state,
municipal, or colonial. The demand for instruction in these subjects at
universities is manifestly increasing; but…will have to be developed in the
graduate school.”141 The HLS faculty thus ceded vast tracts of academic and
curricular territory due to a longstanding commitment to the purity of their
field.
Dean Ames was personally content to remain in Langdell’s groove. His
brief annual reports rarely addressed new issues and primarily updated with
new data the tables that Langdell had developed concerning “the courses of
study and instruction during the year, the text-books used, the number of
exercises per week in each course, and the number of students who offered
themselves for examination.”142 Nine years into his tenure, Ames observed to
the HLSA “how solidly the new foundations of the law school were laid during
[Langdell’s] administration…. His originality and his far-sighted sagacity…
still dominate[] the conduct of the school. For this reason, I have very little
to report to you that is new.”143 At points, as the overcrowding and financial
crises loomed, even the Overseers Visiting Committee became impatient
with Ames’s docility, making an unprecedented reprimand when describing
his annual report as “on the whole, a decided understatement of the school’s
immediate needs.”144
Ames’s decanal stagnation stemmed, in part, from administrative ineptitude.
He refused to surrender any detail of administration to a secretary, and wrote
out all his letters longhand to be copied on the typewriter.145 Though much
beloved, he was apparently unable to analyze matters strategically and chart
an effective course of action. Hence, he continued in the old ways. His
scholarship had a strongly esoteric flavor, importing long out-dated English
doctrine into modern controversies.146 Even in his field of expertise—negotiable
paper—Ames was not consulted when the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law was drafted during the 1890s, and he did not see it until the new law had
been adopted by four states, a fact demonstrating his total detachment from
actual legislation and practice of his time. The strong technical objections
that he later published about the law reflected “his slender experience with
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143. Ames, Address, supra note 8, at 71.
144. Overseers Standing Committee, supra note 34, at 527.
145. [Ames], supra note 51, at 13–14; Williston, supra note 140, at 184.
146. [Ames], supra note 51, at 18; Learned Hand, Foreword, in Samuel Williston, Life and Law, vii
(Little, Brown 1941). I am grateful for the assessment of Daniel R. Coquillette on this point.

28

Journal of Legal Education

the practical business of legislation” and lack “of practical contact with the
world of affairs.” As a result, Ames’s technical critique was largely ignored,
and litigation rarely arose over the supposed defects that he identified.147
In 1907, when Ames expressed interest in assuming a named professorship
in jurisprudence at HLS, Eliot asked him, “Should you advise the faculty to
have a new dean more directly connected with the training of practitioners, or
should you be willing to continue to be dean?…You will correctly infer from
these questions that I have been turning the matter over in my mind lately,
and feel the need of conference with you.”148 Since HLS professors commonly
moved among the named professorships without changing their roles or
duties, as did Langdell, Eliot would scarcely have asked this question if he
were entirely satisfied with Ames’s administration. Ames decided to forego the
professorship and remain as dean.
Ames’s decanal stagnation also stemmed from his exhausting workload,
which certainly contributed to his early death. Students observed that “the
dean doesn’t walk, he always runs, seeming to be in eternal haste. He never
goes up stairs without taking at least two steps at a jump.”149 In the absence of
any institutional strategy, he primarily responded to the overcrowding crisis by
heroically assuming more teaching himself, and his annual reports reveal that
he taught as many, or more, courses than any other faculty member, while also
serving as dean. During his last full academic year in 1908–09, Ames taught
five courses with enrollments of 268, 231, 145, 6, and 2 students. In fall 1909,
he began to have a nervous breakdown, suffering some aphasia and amnesia.
In November, he took a leave of absence and died in January 1910 at the age
of 64.150
Meanwhile, Eliot retired in June 1909 after forty years as president. During
his final decade, critics had begun to argue that he over-emphasized professional
education and funneled too many resources to Harvard’s professional schools
while neglecting the undergraduate college. After the medical school received
its enormous gifts in the early 1900s, Eliot himself began to worry in 1904
that such a large proportion of the university’s endowment was restricted
to the professional schools.151 Consequently, Eliot may have refrained from
including HLS among his annual narrative of Harvard’s needs both because
the law school exemplified Eliot’s commitment to professional education
and because he wondered whether that commitment was unbalancing the
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university’s resources. In a sense, HLS was “too successful” to need money,
and Eliot was unwilling to promote its needs, having extolled its wealth and
accomplishments.
Whatever the explanation, it took decades for HLS to recover from the
financial collapse under Dean Ames. The sudden death of Dean Thayer, the
lack of university support for the 1917 centennial campaign, and the steep
drop in enrollments during World War I prevented any rapid recovery. Eliot’s
successor, President A. Lawrence Lowell, though an alumnus of HLS, took
far more interest in the Graduate School of Business Administration, and the
university did little to support another unsuccessful fundraising campaign by
HLS in the mid-1920s. Consequently, the school had to borrow a $1.5 million
from the university to finish construction of Langdell Hall in 1929. The Great
Depression followed, and in 1936, when James Landis succeeded Roscoe
Pound as dean, HLS was still financially weak and received not a single
endowed professorship during the 1930s.152
When Erwin Griswold became dean in 1946, he found that HLS “had ‘a
great reputation’ and ‘a superb library,’ but was ‘unbelievably poor,’ with a
large mortgage on its major building, Langdell Hall; inadequate dormitory
accommodations and no dining facilities; a faculty that once had been
distinguished, a student-faculty ratio of more than 50 to 1; and bad-tononexistent alumni relations.”153 By that point, the once unrivaled leadership
of HLS had declined to primus inter pares at best, as other leading university law
schools, especially at Yale and Columbia, had caught, if not surpassed, “the
greatest law school in the world.”
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